Critique of Meaning
It is no small task to find comfort in Dostoyevsky’s statement that “freedom will occur only when it doesn’t matter whether one lives or dies” (Dostoevsky 121), nor is it easy to find beauty in the face of the horrors of Auschwitz. Indeed, pain and suffering are so fundamental to human existence that one may wonder whether or not we are doomed to misery, ultimately prompting a sincere search for a single reason not to end one’s own life. The emptiness and seemingly infinite sadness we face, exacerbated by the acute knowledge of the finitude of our existence, leaves many to abandon the prospect of happiness and instead seek something else to make it all worthwhile, some meaning which will justify our being. With the frenzy of men on fire, many take up this search for meaning in a blind, dogmatic haste which to this point has only fanned the flames. Thus, I will attempt to take a step back and ask a fundamental question: how might non-suffering be anything but impossible?
In order to avert the risk of “groping in the dark”, we must proceed slowly and deliberately, and secure a sound method for testing any formulations. As such, we cannot avoid the task of solidly defining our problem set in such a way that it can be evaluated in propositional form. Thus, we will begin by identifying the roots of our human misery. As a foundation for this procedure, we will hold as an axiom that human beings have a tendency to find happiness in a sense of self-worth. This self-worth is challenged by the inescapable finitude and contingency of life, making it therefore impossible to find value in an ambiguous future. However, as Victor Frankl points out, we may solidify ourselves in our past achievements, securing our existence every time we actualize our potential to form a legacy, stating that “having been is the purest form of being” (Frankl 124). As echoed by Barrett and Nietzsche, the loss of this grounding of our existence results in the despair referred to as noogenic neurosis by Frankl and anomie by Durkheim. It is critical to note that this despair is epiphenomenal, resulting from the realization of groundlessness as opposed to the lack of meaning itself. It follows that this effect is a subjective reality. This is pointed out by Frankl, as he notes that “even if each and every case of suicide had not been undertaken out of a feeling of meaninglessness, it may well be that an individual’s impulse to take his life would have been overcome had he been aware of some meaning and purpose worth living for” (Frankl 141).
Following from the epiphenomenal nature of meaninglessness is the possibility of dismantling its manifestation. While questions of existence can hardly be avoided, it may be possible to undermine their affective salience. In order to do so, we must examine the psychology of how one may come to associate meaning with self worth. According to Frankl, the fundamental existential questions revolve around knowing what it is to exist, knowing what the meaning of that existence is, and then willing the unification of the two within oneself (Frankl 100). These aspects of human existence then form a “measuring stick” that we may use to evaluate our self worth (Frankl 146). This process is a good candidate for the associative mechanism which gives meaninglessness its affective bite. In this way, ‑
Frankl has provided us with a target whose elimination may pave the way for the possibility of escaping misery.
Potentially, if the desire to complete this logical function can be eliminated, the pain carried with it will in turn disappear. Put simply, proving such a synthesis impossible might stop us from fretting over our inability to resolve it, therefore overcoming the “existential vacuum” which results. The plausibility of such a maneuver is consistent with Frankl’s contention that although we may not escape the circumstances presented to us in life, we have control over the way in which we stand against them. This is also present in Devils, one example being Kirilov’s statement that “there’s no pain in the stone, there is pain in the fear of the stone” (Dostoyevsky 121). We must not confound this procedure as a simple “willing” to be happy – an absurd task – but observe instead that the subjective stance toward the source of unhappiness is modified, thus preventing the ensuing affective harm.
Extrapolating from Frankl’s contention that “one must have a reason to be happy” (Frankl 140), it may also be true that one must have a reason to be unhappy. As mentioned, the source of existential misery follows from the realization of the failure to form a rational concept of self worth, and as such its rendering impossible may deliver us from such pain. So, we will now attempt to deconstruct the mechanism in order to disable it. The first component of Frankl's noogenic neurosis is “knowing what it means to exist.” Unfortunately, any attempt to disrupt this component is doomed to failure. The first complication is that in order to renounce any knowledge of existence, we must first somehow comprehend non-existence. But how could such comprehension really occur? If we observe that the only way in which we come to know anything, as phenomenal subjects, is through receiving it as an object, we shall see that the simple event act of apprehension implies that something exists. Echoing Descartes' cogito, nothingness cannot logically be experienced. Nor can non-being have a subjective reality, as it would mark the end of subjectivity itself. Perhaps this is what Kirilov means when he denies the existence of death (Dostoevsky 249). So, we are unlikely dismantle Frankl's synthesis through the first route. We must assume that existence is.
Turning to the second aspect, “knowing the meaning of existence”, we run into the more insidious problem of nihilism. Destroying this component is to embrace the idea that existence has no meaning, or at least that the meaning can be known. Accepting this as true, however, renders the individual powerless against his own emotions, reducing the value of his life to the pleasure principle. Perhaps this is the root of Frankl's observation that the majority of alcoholics and other addicts overwhelmingly report the feeling that life means nothing. In the absence of meaning, one's life becomes completely at the mercy of chance – those who are granted happiness live, while everyone else is doomed. There is simply no salvation for the one who suffers. So, any attempt to escape noogenic neurosis by denying the possibility of meaning moves one out of the frying pan and into the fire.
At this point, we are bound to accept that existence is, and that meaning is somehow possible. We are now left with the final alternative – denying the will for the two to be unified within ourselves. However, it is not enough to simply negate this willing within an individual – it must be proven impossible. To do so, we must somehow show that the individual is mutually exclusive with the synthesis of meaning and existence. It is this task that seems to lie at the heart of existentialism, which becomes clear if we are permitted to substitute the word essence for meaning. Such a substitution makes sense if we consider the concepts of the summum bonum and entelechy – the highest good and the reason for being. If the denial of the objective existence of a highest good as a reason for being is at the core of existential thought, as implied by Barrett's contention that “man does not have a ready-made essence” (Barrett 102) the scope of our negation comes into view.
By taking the synthesis of the individual with the unity of meaning and existence as impossible, we are presented with another set of alternatives – the individual as meaning and the individual as existence. Note that conceiving the individual as existence and not meaning is not synonymous with nihilism, but is instead the negation of it facilitated by holding meaning to be something which transcends objective existence. In other words, this is to say that universal meaning and individual existence refer to two different modes of being, thereby sidestepping the question of meaning while leaving it intact.
The individual as existence is the existentialist. He embraces his phenomenal nature, emphasizing the subjective realities inside himself. But what exactly is the individual as existence? At his core, he is his own awareness of his position in time and space, while at the same time the ability to act as an agent. This is reflected in Existence, edited by May, Angel, and Ellenberger, where man is characterized as neither pure subject - “that is, as having reality only as a thinking being” nor “as an object to be calculated and controlled” (May, Angel, & Ellenberger 12). Quoting Kierkegaard, they point out that “truth exists only where the individual produces it in action.” Coupled with Barrett's statement that “all truth is historical” (Barrett 107), we find the ground for Frankl's contention that the individual is secured in himself as he actualizes his potentials and solidifies them in the past. This is echoed in Irrational Man, where Barrett quotes Gasset in saying that “man has no essence, only history” (Barrett 102). In the place of the objective meaning which has been taken out of the picture by emphasizing the individual as existence, the source of worth which forms the measuring stick mentioned by Frankl is simply his own genuine being.
The qualifier “genuine” seems to be the source of Barrett's primary focus on the “Irrational Man.” According to Barrett, “intellectuals suffer a detachment from mankind” (Barrett 135). From this it may be drawn that a human being's genuine existence is outside of the comprehension of reason. Furthermore, the grounds for the worth of the individual as existence are to be found inside oneself, as Barrett says “the self's craving is beyond good and evil – it's the source” (Barrett 129) and that “mankind must become better and more evil” (Barrett 125). This meaning of this seemingly paradoxical statement becomes clear when we recall that in embracing the individual as being, the existence of an objective meaning is suspended, and thus is done no harm by mankind's actions, thus resolving the antimony.
From Man's Search For Meaning, we find that even in the face of suffering we may find comfort in our own being, ultimately rising above all misery. By viewing our own suffering as a chance to better ourselves, we may reroute the pain of suffering and recast it as a human achievement. Thus, “life's meaning is an unconditional one, for it even includes the meaning of unavoidable suffering” (Frankl 118). It must be pointed out that in Frankl's use of the word meaning, he is still embracing the individual as existence, for the meaning of one's own achievement can only be a personal one, not a universal one, thus his own existence grounds itself. Frankl explicitly says that “what matters is not the meaning of life in general but rather the specific meaning of a person's life at a given moment” (Frankl 113).
Again, Frankl has provided us with an opportunity to further our investigation through a potential negation and subsequent rejection of the individual as existence. The problem arises from Frankl's statement that “what can never be ruled out is the unavoidability of suffering” (Frankl 118). In Frankl's formulation, this suffering may be overcome by casting it as an opportunity for human achievement. As the suffering itself is unavoidable, it follows that its conception as an achievement does not negate the suffering which has caused it, but outweighs it with satisfaction. While this may be sufficient for some people, we must now address the possibility that the achievement itself produces insufficient satisfaction to overcome suffering. Perhaps the satisfaction is tainted by a recognition of its transience. More problematic is the dependence of any satisfaction in achievement upon an individual's own association between the achievement and himself. For it is not enough to simply have achieved something, that something must be intrinsically valuable, otherwise all achievements are theoretically neutral. To illustrate, we may examine Frankl's “paradoxical intention”, in which the logotherapist directs the patient to come to find satisfaction in conclusions such as “now I will show them what a good scribbler I am” (for a crippled bookkeeper in danger of losing his job due to his inability to write clearly) or “now I will sweat ten quarts” (for a man afraid of sweating). In these examples, the patients derived their satisfaction from the fact that they were the ones who had achieved something that others could not do. As such, these people associated the achievement with their uniqueness, thus finding some worth in themselves.
However, the possibility remains that one might not see any intrinsic value within himself, and as such derives no satisfaction from associating an achievement with his being. For such an individual to achieve any satisfaction, he draw his worth from an association with an achievement which is valuable in itself. If human misery is truly to be overcome, these individuals are perhaps in the most dire need. This form of existential misery is potentially the most insidious, as the subject draws pain from inside himself as the default state. Finding no relief in the existential solution of the individual as existence, such a person must reject himself and become an individual as meaning. In order to render the synthesis of meaning and existence impossible, this person must choose to reject his individuality. Such a person must look out into the world and find something to subsume themselves into something they identify as possessing a value that they may obtain through communion with.
Unfortunately, the happiness of these people depends on their ability to find something to rest upon which they cannot rationally reduce to meaninglessness, and as such happiness is indirectly proportional to mental acuity. Perhaps this is the reason why Barrett and so many existential philosophers have abandoned the faith in reason alone. And it is likely what Dostoevsky was alluding to when he states that “he was a man of conscience, and therefore very often depressed” (Dostoevsky 10). In a similar vein, Dostoevsky states that the loftiness of one's nature is associated with the propensity for cynical thoughts (Dostoevsky 15), and Frankl casts cynicism as a defense against nihilism (Frankl 153). From these fragments we can gather that these people need to believe in something (hence the lofty nature or need to defend against nihilism), and that they are prone to analysis of the objective value of things (evidenced by conscience and cynicism). These two features are somehow associated with depression. The individual as meaning, unable to find value in himself and having not yet found it in the world, retains the hope in possibly finding it someday by zealously razing everything which fails him. This fervor is what others observe as cynicism, pessimism, and mistanthropy.
For the individual as meaning, who has however renounced his individuality, forsaking his own being as a martyr to a greater cause, there are two escapes from unending suffering. The first is by subsuming himself into the pursuit of his object of meaning. Frankl alluded to this phenomenon in his statement that “the more a human forgets himself, the more human he is and the more he actualizes” (Frankl 115). By identifying himself more and more with the object of his pursuit in order to share in its value, he thus abandons his individuality. A caricature of this may be found in Socrates' statement that “the unexamined life is not worth living.” Unfortunately, the possibility remains that he may not find a worthy pursuit, whether resulting from a clinical malfunction (which Frankl treats as a class outside of logotherapy, to be treated using psychotherapy or medication (Frankl 143), or from the potential reality of no objective meaning amenable to a legitimately superior intellect (possibly relating to correlates between IQ and mood disorders) which Frankl does not believe can be treated with therapy (Frankl 123). In the face of this possibility, there remains one final alternative – an end to one's being. Perhaps it is for this reason that Frankl found that some patients could be comforted by imagining looking back at their lives from the deathbed – cognitively, it was the context of the end of their lives as opposed to the ensuing reflection that eased their pain (see Frankl 120-121). Again we may recall Kirilov's statement that freedom only results when it doesn't matter if one lives or dies.
As mentioned, the task of transcending human misery was to ask how non-suffering was anything but impossible. One who is strictly concerned with escaping pain may hope for ignorance, or find relief in Aldous Huxley's three year plan. But the harder case, the individual looking to truly transcend misery itself, has potentially found an answer in aiming beyond the sěma, finding the strength to carry on with an unscathed hope that there is something greater than the finitude and contingency of their time on earth.
Bibliography
Frankl, Viktor. Man's Search For Meaning. New York: Simon & Schuster Publishers, 1984.
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. Trans, Michael R. Katz. Devils. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Barrett, William. Irrational Man. New York: Doubleday, Inc., 1962.
May, Rollo, Ernest Angel and Henri F. Ellenberger. Existence.
